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ABSTRACT Jordanian politics has seen decades of pro-reform and pro­
democracy political activism, but with little effective change on the Jordanian 
political system itself. This analysis explains how and why the regime has resisted 
more than cosmetic reform and democratic change. It also examines in detail old 
and new avenues of opposition reformist activism in the kingdom, from leftist 
political parties and the Islamist movement to new forms of pro-democracy activism 
in the form of grassroots coalitions, youth movements and social media activism. 
As both government and opposition in Jordan are affected by the 2011 Arab 
uprisings, this analysis examines the past and present possibilities for democratic 
political opposition and for an effective and unified coalition for reform in Jordan. 
Introduction 
The year 2011 began with street demonstrations in Amman and other cities across 
Jordan, inspired by the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions, and calling for 
reform-but not yet revolution or regime change-in the Hashemite Kingdom. 
The anger and resentment that led to these demonstrations were palpable and had 
been growing for a very long time. It reminded many in Jordan and elsewhere of 
similar unrest and social protest in April 1989. Those earlier demonstrations had 
turned quickly into riots, triggered in large part by austerity measures 
implemented as part of an International Monetary Fund (IMF) stabilisation 
programme. But the demonstrations of 1989, like those of 2011, expanded quickly 
to include protest not only against difficult economic circumstances, but also 
against government corruption, while calling for greater and more genuine 
democratisation. 
What alarmed the Hashemite regime in both cases was the large presence and 
even predominance of ethnic East Jordanian or Transjordanian citizens in the 
demonstrations.
1 In short, the demonstrators themselves could not be dismissed as
*Department of Government and Justice Studies, Appalachian State University, Boone, North Carolina 
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1 The largest ethnic division within Jordanian politics is that between Palestinian Jordanians (those whose roots 
are west of the Jordan river, many of whom came to Jordan as refugees of the Arab-Israeli wars of 1948 and 1967) 
and East Jordanians, also known as Transjordanians or East Bankers, since they trace their roots east of the Jordan 
river. In general,  the Hashemite state, army, security services and public sector have been dominated by East 
Jordanians, while Palestinian Jordanians have come to dominate the private sector. As the regime's own 
neoliberal economic reforms shift Jordan's economy from the public to the private sector, ethnic tensions have 
increased within the kingdom.
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 the 'usual suspects' of opposition in Jordan—leftist parties, Islamists, and/or
 Palestinian activists. Rather, the demonstrations ranged across the ideological
 spectrum within Jordan, and even spanned the ethnic divide between Palestinian
 and East Bank Jordanians. Put another way, both traditional opposition forces and
 bedrock constituencies of the regime itself seemed to be out on the streets facing
 that very regime. And in both cases, the latter group seemed to outnumber the
 former. In 1989, then-King Hussein (1952-1999) responded by dismissing the
 extremely unpopular government of Prime Minister Zaid al-Rifa'i (1985-1989)
 and by initiating a broad-ranging programme of political and economic
 liberalisation. Similarly, in 2011, King Abdullah II dismissed the equally
 unpopular government of Prime Minister Samir al-Rifa'i (Zaid al-Rifa'i's son,
 2009-2011), and pledged to restore the kingdom to the path of more genuine
 political and economic reform.
 With dramatic regime change occurring in other Arab states, Jordan's
 opposition has grown larger and more coordinated in its attempts to push the
 regime back towards the reform process, calling for greater democracy and the
 curbing of monarchical powers, in order to make Jordan more of a constitutional
 monarchy. Jordan's 1952 constitution, still in place, provides for a strong
 executive authority vested in the king, a bicameral legislature and an independent
 judiciary. Reformers of almost all stripes tend to argue, however, that since the
 1950s the balance of power has shifted almost entirely towards the monarchy.
 So, Jordan remains a monarchy with a parliament and a constitution, but I would
 argue that it is not yet a constitutional monarchy; that is, one where the powers of
 the monarchy are more limited, where the elected parliament is stronger, where the
 judiciary is truly independent, where the government is democratically elected and
 where the three branches of government check and balance one another.
 The Hashemite regime thus appeared to be stuck—seemingly for years—at a
 crossroads between more liberalisation and democratisation, or a more
 authoritarian path. While Jordan has oscillated between these two extremes, it
 has never become a full blown police state, unlike so many other states in the
 region. But neither has it allowed full liberalisation and democratisation, despite a
 very promising start in 1989. Instead, the Jordanian state has alternated between
 periods of openness and repression over the years. As a kind of middle case that is
 neither fully authoritarian nor fully democratic (although it leans towards the
 former), Jordan can therefore be best described as a 'hybrid regime' or
 'liberalising autocracy', in which the regime has allowed moderate levels of
 political reform, not to transform the system but to preserve it.2 Correspondingly,
 the opposition has for decades called on the regime to choose the path of greater
 democratisation, and to move beyond mere cosmetic reforms, often by forging
 broad-based, yet often fluid 'reform coalitions'.3 The present study explores
 2 See, for example, D. Brumberg, 'The Trap of Liberalized Autocracy', Journal of Democracy, 13(4) (2002),
 pp. 56-68; T. Carothers, 'The End of the Transition Paradigm', Journal of Democracy, 13(2) (2002), pp. 5-21;
 and C. Ryan and J. Schwedler, 'Return to Democratization or New Hybrid Regime? The 2003 Elections in
 Jordan', Middle East Policy, 11(2) (2004), pp. 138-151.
 3 Throughout this analysis, the phrase 'reform coalition' refers to organised alliances between political parties,
 professional associations, trade unions, civil society organisations and other political movements to collectively
 seek specific political and economic reform and change. For a further discussion of the 'reform coalition', see also
 the introductory contribution by H. Kraetzschmar, 'Mapping Opposition Cooperation in the Arab World:
 From Single-Issue Coalitions to Transnational Networks'. The analysis draws on extensive field research and
 interviews with individuals in all the above types of groups, reform activists and government officials (including
 those for and against democratic change) conducted on frequent visits to Jordan between 1989 and 2011.
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 regime-opposition dynamics in Jordan since the early 1990s, focusing on past and
 present attempts at opposition cooperation and their success in challenging the
 Hashemite regime to initiate genuine liberalising reform.
 In the analysis that follows, I posit that the ingredients for a broad-ranging and
 even unified reform coalition exist in Jordanian politics and that since 1989 we
 have seen numerous attempts at creating such coalitions against authoritarian
 policies; yet that despite their efforts at unity and activism, opposition reformers
 have had very little success in achieving meaningful political change. Why?
 I argue that the regime has long used structural and institutional means (especially
 through ever-changing laws regarding elections, parties and parliamentary
 participation) to check and contain the power of opposition forces. It has also
 tended to use a divide and rule strategy, splitting opposition forces along the lines
 of the many fissures in Jordanian society—between Palestinians and Jordanians,
 leftists and Islamists, and even within the Islamist movement itself—and thus
 rendering difficult, if not impossible, any effective opposition coordination. This
 analysis will explore each of these issues, and why reform coalitions, both past and
 present, have thus far been frustrated in their efforts at pressuring the incumbent
 regime into liberalising reforms, but it will also examine how the dynamics of
 opposition have changed in the context of the Arab uprisings—including both
 traditional and new reform coalitions—and what this in turn may mean for the
 prospects of reform and democratisation in the kingdom.
 In the sections below, I will first explain the state of reform efforts in the
 kingdom, and hence the extent of opposition frustrations. The analysis then turns
 to the 'traditional' opposition in the form of opposition political parties and
 examines the successes and failures of these forces in gaining political power and
 influence over the decision-making process through the ballot box.4 It is in this
 context also that efforts by the country's traditional opposition at forging cross
 ideological/cross-party cooperation will be explored. Lastly, this contribution
 examines the current state of unrest and opposition in Jordan in the context of
 the 2011 Arab uprisings, and what this may suggest for the emergence of new
 forms of democratic opposition and potentially a new reform coalition in
 Jordanian politics.
 The reform question in Jordan
 Jordan began its liberalisation process in response not to the Arab uprisings of
 2011, but to widespread popular unrest in April 1989. Even though the
 motivations were defensive on the part of the regime, it initiated a political and
 liberalisation process that included the revival of elections and parliamentary life.5
 At the time, Jordan's liberalisation looked to be the most promising and the most
 extensive in the entire Arab world. Over time, the process expanded to include
 the lifting of martial law, the legalisation of political parties, loosening of
 restrictions on the media, and six rounds of national parliamentary elections
 4 See also E. Lust, 'Elections under Authoritarianism: Preliminary Lessons from Jordan'. Democratization,
 13(3) (2006). pp. 456-471; and J. Gandhi and E. Lust, 'Elections under Authoritarianism'. Annual Review of
 Political Science, 12(1) (2009), pp. 403-422.
 5 R. Brynen, 'Economic Crisis and Post-Rentier Democratization in the Arab World: The Case of Jordan',
 Canadian Journal of Political Science, 25(1) (1992), pp. 69-97; M. Mufti, 'Elite Bargains and the Onset of
 Political Liberalization in Jordan', Comparative Political Studies, 32(1) (1999), pp. 100-129; and G.E. Robinson,
 'Defensive Democratization in Jordan", International Journal of Middle East Studies, 30(3) (1998), pp. 387-410.
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 (in 1989, 1993, 1997, 2003, 2007 and 2010).6 Economically, Jordan moved
 steadily towards a neoliberal model of development, with emphasis on privatising
 state-owned industries, lowering barriers to trade and encouraging extensive
 foreign investment.
 Yet while economic liberalisation has proceeded apace since 1989, political
 reform has since faltered, stalled and at times regressed. Over the past two
 decades Jordan has, in short, experienced both liberalisation and de-liberalisation
 in its political life, as the state has at times retreated from earlier reforms.
 This was especially clear in the aftermath of Jordan's peace treaty with Israel in
 1994.7 Erstwhile King Hussein's regime showed little patience for opposition
 to the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty, and thus Jordan's 'political opening' began
 to close. In 1999, however, following the succession to the throne from King
 Hussein to King Abdullah II, it appeared that the door of reform was opening once
 again.8
 When King Abdullah first ascended the throne, Jordan's domestic and regional
 climate was initially remarkably stable, and the new king allowed municipal
 elections to take place as scheduled in July 1999. It seemed that for the first time in
 years the kingdom might finally be able to move beyond its difficult geography
 and its various security concerns, to renew and consolidate the reform process at
 home. But since that time, regional and domestic security concerns have
 continually trumped attempts at domestic political reform. The brief period of
 regional stability turned out to be little more than a mirage. When the second
 Palestinian uprising or intifada erupted in September 2000 (in the West Bank and
 Gaza), the Jordanian government worried about its impact on domestic stability,
 including fears that Israel would expel thousands and perhaps even millions of
 Palestinians to Jordan. With the intifada still raging, the US war in Afghanistan
 (and the Jordanian regime's support for it) beginning in 2001 only widened the gap
 between the government and its opposition. By 2003, US forces had invaded
 Jordan's eastern neighbour, Iraq, undermining Jordan's regional security still
 further. Not only was the kingdom wedged between escalating conflicts, but it also
 had to absorb waves of Iraqi refugees fleeing the US invasion and the widespread
 unrest, insurgency and terrorism that followed.
 The security concerns have consistently served to derail the opposition goal of
 greater democratisation, while economic liberalisation has moved steadily
 forward—especially in the form of privatisation—and has had a profound social
 impact. As the state sector declines in size, so does the social welfare component
 of previously reliable state employment. Jordanians complain consistently about
 rising unemployment, underemployment, poverty and corruption among business
 and government elites. These economic frustrations have fuelled social unrest and
 motivated many Jordanians to mobilise politically and press the state to return to
 6 C.R. Ryan, 'Elections and Parliamentary Democratization in Jordan', Democratization, 5(4) (1998),
 pp. 194-214; Ryan and Schwedler, "Return to Democratization or New Hybrid Regime?', pp. 138-151;
 H. Hourani et al„ Dirasat fi al-lntakhabat al-Niyabiyya al-Urduniyya [Studies in the 1997 Representative
 [Parliamentary] Elections] (Amman: Al-Urdun al-Jadid Research Center, 2002).
 7 L.A. Brand, 'The Effects of the Peace Process on Political Liberalization in Jordan', Journal of Palestine
 Studies, 28(2) (1999), pp. 52-67; J. Schwedler, 'Don't Blink: Jordan's Democratic Opening and Closing',
 MERIP Press Information Note, 3 July 2002, http://www.merip.org/mero/mero070302.
 8 For a broader analysis of the four major transitions in Jordanian politics since 1989 (political liberalisation,
 economic liberalisation, peace with Israel, and the royal succession), see C.R. Ryan, Jordan in Transition: From
 Hussein to Abdullah (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002).
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 its long-promised political liberalisation and reform programme.9 Yet anti-reform
 hardliners in the regime (and especially in the intelligence services or mukhabarat)
 have for decades used security concerns as their main argument against opening
 the political system to greater public participation. As long-time democracy
 activist Mustafa Hamarneh has noted, however, this regime argument relies on a
 kind of reverse logic. 'To say if we open up, we sow instability is a statement
 I flatly reject,' he argues. 'I believe it's the other way around; the lack of opening
 up sows the seeds of instability.'10 Regime obsessions with security concerns, in
 short, actually undermine security. Within the field of comparative politics, then,
 this mirrors the international relations theory concept of the 'security dilemma', in
 which states in the international arena unwittingly undermine their own security,
 even as they try to enhance it. In domestic politics, authoritarian and semi
 authoritarian regimes often do much the same thing in state-society relations,
 building their security apparatus, but also simultaneously undermining their
 legitimacy and security vis-a-vis their own societies.11
 In an analysis of stalled reform in Jordan, the International Crisis Group (ICJ) in
 2003 suggested that the 'deficit of democratic representation' might provide the
 spark for real conflict in the kingdom, even going so far as to compare Jordan to
 Algeria. But the same report also remarked upon the weakness of Jordan's
 political opposition, arguing that 'too often, opposition parties and civil society
 have contented themselves with vacuous slogans and unrealistic proposals that do
 not resonate with the people and further undermine the credibility of political
 action'.12 Analysing rising tensions and unrest in the kingdom, the ICG noted that
 governmental reform efforts seemed to focus mainly on procedural democracy—
 that is, the act of elections—without providing meaningful channels for
 genuine participation, transparency and accountability.13 While the lack of these
 factors does not lead automatically to corruption, they nonetheless make it more
 likely, especially in the context of extensive economic liberalisation, as the state
 shifts from a public to a private sector-dominated economy. Furthermore, it is
 quite telling that the single greatest point of unity across the Jordanian political
 spectrum is the belief that corruption is a major problem in politics, society and the
 economy.
 Investigating the unrest that led to six deaths in recurrent violence in the
 southern town of Ma'an in November 2002, the ICG argued that:
 Nevertheless, the regime's Achilles heel is the feeble bond of trust between most citizens
 and the state. Meaningful relationships are based primarily on family or tribal loyalties,
 with religion also an important social glue. The state, however, is largely absent from
 9 K. Abdul-Wahab, 'Reaping What We've Sown: The Economic Protests', JO Magazine, 28 April 2011. On the
 economic reform process, see A.M. Peters and P.W. Moore, 'Beyond Boom and Bust: External Rents, Durable
 Authoritarianism, and Institutional Adaptation in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan', Studies in Comparative
 International Development, 44(3) (2009), pp. 256-285; and S. Alissa, Rethinking Economic Reform in Jordan:
 Confronting Socioeconomic Realities (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Carnegie
 Papers Number 4, July 2007).
 10 M. Hamarneh, 'Political Truths: Interview', Jordan Business, March 2009, p. 58.
 11 For a detailed discussion of this phenomenon in the context of the Arab world, see C. Ryan, 'Security
 Dilemmas in Arab Polities', in C. Ryan, Inter-Arab Alliances: Regime Security and Jordanian Foreign Policy
 (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2009), pp. 23-42.
 12 International Crisis Group, 'The Challenge of Political Reform: Jordanian Democratisation and Regional
 Instability', Middle East Briefing, Amman/Brussels, 8 October 2003, p. 1.
 13 Ibid.
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 these relations, being broadly perceived as non-transparent, unresponsive and
 unaccountable.14
 The report also cited King Abdullah himself, who was quoted the same year in an
 American newspaper stating that:
 The leadership of the Middle East don't understand that 50 percent of the population is
 under eighteen, and if they don't get going to create some means for real participation for
 these young people, they are going to have serious problems.15
 That was, then and now, good advice for Jordan and all other Arab regimes. Yet
 the Jordanian monarchy does not seem to have been following its own advice.
 Indeed, the struggle over increased participation and reform has dominated
 Jordanian politics for decades, even under the reign of King Abdullah from 1999
 onwards.
 In an attempt to achieve political reform. King Abdullah in 2004 appointed the
 kingdom's former foreign minister and prominent reformer Marwan Muasher to
 the post of Deputy Prime Minister for Reform.16 In that capacity, Muasher was
 tasked to lead a broad-based committee of Jordanians (drawn from government
 and across society) in creating what was called the 'National Agenda' for reform.
 That effort resulted in calls for broader political reform within the kingdom,
 including the rights of women, and a deepening of Jordan's nascent civil society
 specifically. As Muasher noted at the time, even the concept of civil society has
 sometimes been reduced to include only charitable NGOs, and not political
 parties, professional associations or trade unions, effectively de-politicising the
 concept. Consequentially he called for a broader conceptualisation of civil society,
 to include all of these types of organisations, independent of the state itself, with
 goals ranging from social to economic to political. In this way, he surmised,
 political liberalisation (in Jordan and elsewhere) can finally move forward, but
 only with a strengthened civil society as its base.17
 Unveiled in 2005, the National Agenda, however, was met with overt hostility
 by many anti-reform hardliners within the regime, and with considerable
 indifference on the part of a Jordanian public that seemed to have grown tired of
 new top-down initiatives and slogans emanating from the regime itself. In the
 words of one NGO activist, 'We have many regime slogans: think big, act big;
 Jordan First; political development; the National Agenda—these are Western style
 marketing slogans. They work more for marketing outside the country, but not
 inside the country'.18 Similarly, another NGO director argued that:
 This is the problem, the contradiction between speeches and implementation. We have
 now had Jordan First, political development and the new ministry for it, and now the
 National Agenda. Continually new programmes are launched, but still with little effect.
 Little actual involvement. The quota for women, for example, or the National Center for
 Human Rights, these are both ok but very small steps. The National Center for Human
 Rights, for instance, is not actually fully independent of the government. These are
 advances in relatively small details ... We don't suffer like the people of Syria or Saudi
 Arabia, but we don't need to compare ourselves to them. We are stable and have a better
 14 Ibid., p 2.
 15 J. Diehl, 'Jordan's Democracy Option', The Washington Post, 21 September 2003.
 16 See Muasher's own discussion of the struggle for the National Agenda for reform. M. Muasher, The Arab
 Center: The Promise of Moderation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), pp. 246-253.
 17 Ibid.
 IS Interview with the author, Amman, Jordan, May 2005.
 372
 POLITICAL OPPOSITION AND REFORM COALITIONS IN JORDAN
 economic situation. But why do we have to pay a political price for this? This should
 simply be the norm. We have a mature and educated population. Few listen to the real
 extremists here. Palestinians for example may have real grievances but we don't see mobs
 in the street. We all try to solve things with soft pressure.19
 It may be, however, that faith in 'soft pressure' has begun to fade, as people in
 2010 and 2011 were indeed in the streets demanding real reform, and most were
 East Jordanians. Muasher himself points not to problems at the grassroots but in
 the ruling elite. In his words:
 The problem is that the political system doesn't want (reform)—the political elite, the
 intelligence services, and the status quo in Jordan and the Arab world in general. Opening
 the system to them boils down to reducing their privileges. The excuses are endless. But
 the bottom line is that they don't want their privileges to go.20
 In the years following the 1999 accession of King Abdullah, both conservative
 and reform constituencies seemed to think that a young and active king was on
 their side. Yet in more recent years what is striking is that both sides seem to
 believe that they have been abandoned—and that the king is on the other side.
 Reform activists from civil society organisations and political parties argue that
 the monarchy has retrenched and is more authoritarian now than it was in 1999.
 Right-wing 'old guard' elites, in contrast, seem to feel that the regime has gone too
 far, selling the country out in its quest for neoliberal economic development. This
 debate has also taken on a steadily more nationalist tone, as ethnic identity politics
 has risen sharply in response to domestic and regional crises. Conservative East
 Jordanian nationalists, for example, increasingly question 'reform' at all; and
 often argue that it is not about liberalisation or democratisation, but is too often
 mistaken for being synonymous with Palestinian empowerment.21 In any case,
 what is more broadly clear is that after years of political stagnation, social and
 political dissatisfaction with the status quo is the prevalent mood in the kingdom,
 cutting across ethnic, religious, gender and ideological lines. If Jordanians are so
 united in their desire for change, then, can they also be united in political activism
 to achieve the much desired democratic reforms?
 Opposition Political Parties and Elections
 Much of the traditional locus of opposition in Jordan has been the country's legal
 political parties. Yet Jordan's party system, aside from the Islamist movement, is
 notoriously weak. Political parties were illegal in the kingdom for more than 30
 years, until the Jordanian regime re-established elections for parliament in 1989
 after a long hiatus, and legalised political parties in 1991.22 Many in the opposition
 19 Interview with the author, Amman, Jordan, May 2005.
 20 Author interview with Dr. Marwan Muasher. Washington, DC, 1 May 2010.
 21 For a discussion of resurgent ethnic identity politics in Jordan, see C.R. Ryan, '"We Are All Jordan" ...
 But Who is We?', Middle East Report Online, 13 July 2010, http://www.merip.org/mero/mero071310 (accessed
 13 July 2010).
 22 The Hashemite monarchy banned political parties in 1957, following a failed military coup attempt against the
 regime by Nasserist and leftist officers. The overthrow of the neighbouring Hashemite monarchy in Iraq in 1958,
 and the killing of the entire Hashemite royal family there, served to underscore the regime's conviction that the
 greatest threat to its survival—in the 1950s—came from Nasserist, leftist, and Pan-Arab parties and movements.
 On this period, see U. Dann, King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism, 1955-1967 (New York:
 Oxford University Press, 1989); and K. Salibi, The Modern History of Jordan (London: I.B. Tauris, 1998),
 pp. 197-221.
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 welcomed the return of parties, elections and more active parliamentary life as a
 return to the more vibrant politics of the 1950s.23 Many have also complained,
 however, of the chronic weakness of Jordan's political parties and party system,
 which they see as being in marked contrast to the more vibrant party political era
 of the 1950s. Yet as Ellen Lust has demonstrated, that is not actually true.24 Parties
 and party systems are indeed weak in Jordan, but that was also the case in the
 1950s. In short, parties and the party system were weak then, and they are weak
 now.
 What has changed, however, is the reversal in fortunes across the ideological
 spectrum. Even if the parties themselves did not command large segments of
 voters, the earlier liberalisation period saw weak Islamist parties competing with
 then-ascendant leftist parties in the heyday of Pan-Arabism, with Pan-Arab
 nationalist, Ba'thist, socialist and communist parties all competing for votes. In
 the 1950s, the secular left and Pan-Arabist parties competed not only with the
 then-small Islamist movement, but more so with each other. In short, cross
 ideological alliances between parties were rare. In the post-1989 period, the
 reverse is true. The Islamist movement—in the form of the Jordanian Muslim
 Brotherhood (MB) and its legal party the Islamic Action Front (IAF)—has been
 the most popular and best organised of the opposition forces, while the parties of
 the left remain to some extent in the shadow of the Islamists, competing for far
 smaller segments of the electorate. This shift in hegemony within the Jordanian
 party system, from the secular left to religious right, reflects broader trends across
 the entire region from the 1950s to the present. As Michaelle Browers has
 demonstrated, the entire region has seen an ideological transformation featuring
 not only the rise of Islamist movements, but also the rise of moderation and
 accommodation between the secular left and religious right, in which parties and
 movements that once seemed diametrically opposed have found some elements of
 common ground, leading to previously unthinkable alliances and coalitions in
 Arab politics. In her words, 'the relationship among competing ideologies of
 opposition in the contemporary Arab region is best characterized as
 accommodationist, with strategic alliances forming among more pragmatic and
 moderate wings of otherwise opposed ideological factions of marginalized
 groups'.25
 In the Jordanian case, this transformation has led leftist parties to work more
 often with, rather than against, the Islamist movement, and just as importantly, it
 has led them to abandon many intra-left rivalries to work with each other.
 At present, the most consistently active leftist parties in Jordanian politics include
 the Jordanian Communist Party (JCP), the People's Democratic Party (PDP, better
 23 Jordanians were so ready for the resumption of multi-party elections, in fact, that a series of studies had already
 been published on Jordanian political parties in anticipation of the return of party life. See, for example, A. Abu
 Khusa, Al-Dimuqratiyya wa al-Ahzab al-Siyasiyya al-Urduniyya [Democracy and Jordanian Political Parties]
 (Amman: Middle East Publishing Company, 1991); M.A.S. al-Abdalat, Kharita al-Ahzab al-Siyasiyya
 al-Urduniyya [Map of Jordanian Political Parties] (Amman: Dar al-Ubra, 1992); S. Sways, 'Kharita al-Ahzab
 al-Siyasiyya fi al-Urdun' [A Map of Political Parties in Jordan] (Amman: Al-Urdun al-Jadid, 1990), pp. 122-141;
 R. al-Khatib Iyad, Al-Tayarat al-Siyasiyya fi al-Urdun wa Nas al-Mithaq al-Watani al-Urduni [Political
 Tendencies in Jordan and Text of the Jordanian National Charter] (Amman: al-Matba'a al-Wataniyya (National
 Printing House), 1991).
 24 E.M. Lust-Okar, 'The Decline of Jordanian Political Parties: Myth or Reality?', International Journal of
 Middle East Studies, 33(4) (2001), pp. 545-569.
 25 M. Browers, Political Ideology in the Arab World: Accommodation and Transformation (Cambridge:
 Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 176.
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 known as Hashd and linked to the Democratic Front for the Liberation of
 Palestine), the Popular Unity Party (PUP, linked to the Popular Front for the
 Liberation of Palestine), and two Jordanian Arab Socialist Ba'ath parties (one
 historically with links to Syria and one to Iraq). Yet in the post-1989 era, perhaps
 because of their small size, these parties are far more likely to try to cooperate and
 ally with one another than was the case in the 1950s and 1960s, when political
 parties often rivalled one another, in effect reproducing domestically the external
 ideological conflicts of inter-Arab regional politics and the 'Arab Cold War'.26
 Even combined, however, these leftist and Pan-Arab nationalist parties tend to
 garner far less popular support (either in terms of membership or voters)
 than the political wing of the Jordanian Islamist movement, the IAF.27
 Jordan's Muslim Brotherhood is actually as old as the Hashemite monarchy
 itself. Unlike its counterparts in Syria or Egypt (before 2011), the Jordanian
 Muslim Brotherhood has enjoyed a more cooperative relationship with the state as
 a loyal opposition organisation that accepted the legitimacy of its Hashemite
 rulers. And unlike Hamas, the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood has no militant
 wing, and instead focuses on democratic activism, and on organising through a
 civilian party (the IAF), membership in professional associations and through
 extensive charity work.28 The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood is a fairly broad
 movement that includes different wings, usually seen as 'hawkish' or 'dovish' in
 their approaches to elections, participation and cooperation with the regime itself.
 More militant Qutbist Islamists or ultra-conservative (but historically avoiding
 participation entirely) Salafi strains of Islamism have, however, generally
 appeared outside the framework of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood."9
 Given their long history of organisation and activism, Jordan's Islamists were
 well placed for electoral success once the liberalisation process began in 1989.
 Since then, Jordan has held six rounds of national parliamentary elections, with
 multiple changes to the electoral law, and hence to the rules of the game. In the
 first of these elections, in 1989, an assortment of leftist party candidates secured
 together a mere 13 of the 80 seats in parliament, while the Muslim Brotherhood
 and independent Islamists garnered 34 seats.30 Together, however, these
 opposition parliamentarians constituted a majority and used their numbers to
 elect an Islamist leader, Dr. 'Abd al-Latif al-'Arabiyyat (1989-1993), as speaker
 of parliament. Surprised and dismayed at the success of the Islamists in particular,
 the regime quickly moved to change the parliamentary electoral rules from the
 'block vote' system, whereby voters have as many votes as there are seats in a
 26 M. Kerr, The Arab Cold War: Carnal 'Abd al-Nasir and His Rivals, 1958-1970 (London: Oxford University
 Press, 1970).
 27 On Jordanian parties and the party system, see Al-Dimuqratiyya fi al-Hayat al-Dakhiliyya li al-Ahzab
 al-Siyasiyya al-'Arabiyya [Democracy in the Practice of Arab Political Parties] (Amman: Al-Quds Center for
 Political Studies, 2010); and Al-Qu'anin al-Nazimat li al-'Amal al-Hizbi fi al-Urdun [Revisiting Political Party
 Legislation in Jordan] (Amman: Al-Quds Center for Political Studies, 2010).
 28 J. Schwedler, Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen (Cambridge: Cambridge University
 Press, 2006); Q. Wiktorowicz, The Management of Islamic Activism: Salafis, the Muslim Brotherhood, and State
 Power in Jordan (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000).
 29 C.R. Ryan, 'Islamist Political Activism in Jordan: Moderation, Militancy, and Democracy', Middle East
 Review of International Affairs, 12(2) (2008), pp. 1-13.
 30 In the 1989 elections, all candidates technically ran as independents since parties remained illegal. From the
 1993 elections onwards, however, candidates have been able to run with legal party affiliations. Underscoring the
 weakness of the Jordanian party system, however, most candidates in any election have been non-partisan or
 independent, rather than from Islamist, leftist, or nationalist parties. On the 1989 elections, see K.S. Abu Jaber and
 S.H. Fathi, 'The 1989 Jordanian Parliamentary Elections', Orient, 31 (1990), pp. 67-86.
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 given district, to a 'one-person one-vote' system, hoping this would forestall
 similar opposition inroads in future elections. Indeed, it was assumed that left with
 only one vote to cast, voters would place family and kinship ties above ideological
 considerations in their choice of candidates, thus diminishing the electoral
 o * m
 prospects of Islamist contestants. As intended by the regime, the revised
 electoral system produced a marked reversal of fortunes for Islamist and leftist
 parties in the 1993 election, reducing their representation to 22 and 7 out of 80
 parliamentary seats, respectively.32 Following the 1993 debacle, and in what
 would become a recurring theme, opposition parties decided to boycott the 1997
 elections entirely, demanding a change in the electoral law.33 The resultant
 1997-2001 legislature was thus made up almost entirely of loyalist and
 conservative tribal elites, while opposition forces remained effectively
 unrepresented in parliament until the next elections in 2003.
 Following the royal succession from King Hussein to King Abdullah II in 1999,
 parliament was dissolved, but new elections—expected in 2001—were delayed
 for two full years to 2003, due mainly to the regime's security concerns amid
 regional turmoil. As mentioned earlier, these regional conflicts included the 2000
 Palestinian uprising against Israeli rule in the West Bank and Gaza, and the US
 invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. But in 2003, the elections were
 finally held under yet another electoral law. The new law increased the number of
 parliamentary seats from 80 to 104, with the introduction of new (but still uneven)
 electoral districts, and added six more parliamentary seats in a specific quota for
 women's representation. Held in June that year, the elections themselves returned
 some opposition representation to the Jordanian legislature, with 17 seats going to
 the IAF, including one to Hayat al-Musayni, its first female candidate. Five
 independent Islamists were also elected.34
 Despite the return of the opposition to parliament in 2003, struggles between the
 regime and opposition parties continued to centre around electoral reform, with
 the latter demanding the abolition of the 'one-person one-vote' system and the
 redrawing of electoral districts, all of which had been designed to curb the
 potential power of opposition parties. By 2007, however, the regime was even less
 inclined to respond to opposition demands, and seemed in fact to be highly
 concerned with electoral successes of Islamist movements elsewhere in the region,
 from Hamas in Palestine to Hizbullah in Lebanon. With these security concerns in
 mind, the 2007 elections, presided over by then-Prime Minister Marouf Bakhit
 (2005-2007), were perhaps the most egregiously rigged contests of the post-1989
 period. The regime had been alarmed by the 2005 al-Qa'ida terrorist attacks in
 Amman and by the 2006 electoral success of Hamas in the Palestinian territories,
 and seemed determined to prevent Islamist inroads at all costs.35 That strategy
 may have worked, with Islamist candidates winning a mere six out of 110
 parliamentary seats, but it also undermined the legitimacy of the electoral process
 31 Author interviews with opposition activists, journalists and government officials, Amman, Jordan, June 2010,
 December 2010 and June 2011.
 12 M.C. Wilson, "Jordan: Bread, Freedom, or Both?', Current History (February 1994), pp. 87-90. For details on
 the 1993 elections, see also Robinson, 'Defensive Democratization in Jordan'; and Ryan, 'Elections and
 Parliamentary Democratization in Jordan'.
 33 For further details on the 1989, 1993 and 1997 elections, see Ryan, Jordan in Transition, pp. 15-45.
 34 On the 2003 elections, see Ryan and Schwedler, 'Return to Democratization or New Hybrid Regime?'.
 35 A. Susser, 'Jordan: Preserving Domestic Order in a Setting of Regional Turmoil', Middle East Brief No. 27,
 Crown Center for Middle East Studies, Brandeis University, March 2008, pp. 4-5.
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 and of the resultant parliament itself. Even the monarchy seemed to eventually
 acknowledge this legitimacy deficit, as it later dismissed the entire parliament two
 years before the completion of its term.
 With new elections scheduled for 2010, the regime yet again introduced minor
 amendments to the parliamentary electoral law, though without changing the
 actual voting system as demanded by the opposition.36 As in the past, the elections
 were conducted on a 'one-person one-vote' basis, prompting the IAF to boycott
 the poll. Most leftist parties, meanwhile, chose to participate in the elections, but
 with almost no success. In fact, not a single opposition party candidate won a seat
 outright in the new parliament. The only exceptions were Abla Abu Elbeh, the
 secretary general of the leftist Hashed Party, who secured a seat as one of the 12
 MPs elected on the women's quota. Similarly, Wafa Bani Mustafa, an Islamist
 candidate, was elected after she defied the IAF boycott and won a women's quota
 seat.37
 As this discussion has illustrated, opposition parties have since 1989 had limited
 success in securing representation in the Jordanian parliament. Leftist parties have
 been particularly ineffective, leading one democracy activist to dismiss them as
 'somehow Left without being progressive. They are old Left. Just oppositionist as
 a career. They still act like they are an opposition in exile. They don't know how to
 work inside the system, even when they are in it' ,38 The Islamist movement, on the
 other hand, has a larger popular following, is better organised and has had greater
 success in past elections, but regards the various electoral laws as specifically
 aimed at minimising its representation, power and influence in the Jordanian
 legislature. In fact, over the past two decades, regime and opposition parties have
 been at loggerheads over the rules of the electoral game, with the latter pressing
 for a return to a block voting system or (even better) a shift to a proportional
 representation (PR) system based on party lists. Opposition parties on the political
 left and right insist that they remain weak precisely because of Jordan's 'one
 person one-vote' electoral laws that encourage citizens to vote along family, clan
 or tribal lines. In a PR system, they argue, parties would be strengthened through
 the voting process and citizens would cast votes based on policies and party
 platforms rather than family ties and/or personalities.39
 Opposition Parties and Cross-ideological Cooperation
 The literature on cross-ideological cooperation in the Middle East suggests that
 leftist-Islamist cooperation and alliances are indeed more likely in the
 contemporary period than at any time in the past; yet scholars differ on how
 viable, effective or durable such alliances and coalitions can be in Arab politics.
 36 The 2010 electoral law kept the uneven districts, but added four new seats for Amman, Irbid and Zarqa (cities
 with large Palestinian populations), and doubled the women's quota from six to 12 seats in parliament. For an
 analysis of the details and reactions, see C.R. Ryan, 'Jordan's New Electoral Law: Reform, Reaction, or Status
 Quo?', Foreign Policy, Middle East Channel, 24 May 2010, http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/05/24/
 jordan_s_new_electoral_law_reform_reaction_or_status_quo (accessed 24 May 2010).
 37 On the 2010 elections and their aftermath, see C.R. Ryan, 'Deja Vu All Over Again? Jordan's 2010 Elections',
 Foreign Policy, Middle East Channel, 15 November 2010, http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/ll/15/
 jordanians_go_to_the_polls (accessed 15 November 2010).
 38 Author interview with democracy activist, Amman, Jordan, June 2001.
 39 On the state and the Islamist movement, see Al-Dawla wa al-Ikhwan 1999-2008 [The State and the
 Brotherhood 1999-2008] (Amman: Al-Quds Center for Political Studies, 2008); and Al-Din wa al-Dawla:
 al-Urdun [Religion and the State: Jordan] (Amman: Al-Quds Center for Political Studies, 2010).
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 While Browers has argued for the importance of cross-ideological cooperation
 trends in the region, Cavatorta has challenged this, noting the difficulties in
 practice of actually achieving cooperation, especially in the cases of Morocco and
 Tunisia.40 The Jordanian case actually illustrates both trends; attempts at greater
 leftist-Islamist cooperation, for example, but also limitations to effective
 opposition coordination or unity.
 Within Jordan, despite differences in ideological and even religious orientation,
 opposition parties of all shades actually agree on several key political issues,
 thereby providing a plausible basis for unified action and the formation of broad
 based reform coalitions. Most have been sharply critical of the peace treaty with
 the state of Israel, for example. They have demanded that the regime cease
 normalising relations with Israel, and some even demand the abolition of the treaty
 itself.41 Within domestic politics and policy, the country's opposition parties also
 insist that future prime ministers and cabinets should be drawn from parliament in
 a truer model of a parliamentary system, rather than royally appointed, pending
 only the formality of parliamentary approval, and, most crucially, that the extant
 electoral law be fundamentally changed.
 However, despite this unified set of opposition demands towards the Hashemite
 rulers, and in contrast to regime-opposition dynamics elsewhere in the region, the
 struggle for reform has remained confined to public policy and the direction of the
 state (including demands for democratic reform) and never challenged the state
 itself as a Hashemite monarchy. What is more, it appears that the diverse set of
 opposition parties and actors find it easier to agree on foreign policy issues, rather
 than on domestic ones, especially regarding the situation in the Palestinian
 territories and Iraq.42 Indeed, regional political issues have on many occasions
 united not only the opposition, but also many current or past regime elites
 themselves. The 2003 US invasion of Iraq, for example, was opposed by state and
 society in Jordan, regime and opposition alike, albeit to varying degrees. Ninety
 well-known Jordanian political figures even signed a public petition, presented to
 the king, condemning the US war as aggression, and in effect putting the
 monarchy itself on notice not to soften its opposition to US policy, regardless of
 the depth of the US-Jordanian alliance.43
 But besides general agreement on foreign policy issues, that they have almost
 no hope of affecting, and some convergence on domestic reform demands, can
 opposition parties agree on key issues and perhaps work together as a broader
 reform coalition in pressuring the regime into liberalising reforms? The record for
 40 Browers, Political Ideology in the Arab World; F. Cavatorta, 'Divided They Stand, Divided They Fail:
 Opposition Politics in Morocco', Democratization, 16(2) (2009), pp. 137-156; and F. Cavatorta, 'More Than
 Repression: Strategies of Regime Survival: The Significance of Divide et Impera in Morocco', Journal of
 Contemporary African Studies, 25(2) (2007), pp. 187-203. See also Haugbolle/Cavatorta and Wegner/Pellicer in
 this issue for theoretical and empirical discussions demonstrating the limits of ideological cooperation.
 41 Opposition to the 1994 Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty led leftist and Islamist activists to organise, through the
 political parties and the professional associations, an 'anti-normalisation' campaign from 1994 onwards, so that
 the peace remains a cold one between the two governments, but with limited links between the two societies. See
 P.L. Scham and R.E. Lucas, '"Normalization" and "Anti-Normalization" in Jordan: The Public Debate', Israel
 Affairs, 9(3) (2003), pp. 141-164.
 4 For extensive analysis of cross-ideological cooperation and its limits in Jordan, see J. Clark, 'Threats,
 Structures and Resources: Cross-ideological Coalition Building in Jordan', Comparative Politics, 43(3) (2010),
 pp. 101-120; J.A. Clark, 'The Conditions of Islamist Moderation: Unpacking Cross-ideological Cooperation in
 Jordan', International Journal of Middle East Studies, 38(4) (2006), pp. 539-560; and J. Schwedler and J. A.
 Clark, 'Islamist-Leftist Cooperation in the Arab World', IS1M Review, 18 (20061, pp. 10-11.
 43 F. Sawalha, 'Opposites Attract on Petition to Declare War on Iraq "Illegal"', Jordan Times, 1 April 2003.
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 political opposition in Jordan shows that opposition parties and independent
 activists have at times splintered, and at times worked together. In her analyses of
 political activism in Jordan and elsewhere in the Arab world, Ellen Lust has
 emphasised the importance of context and structures between government and
 opposition. We can expect opposition to increase during economic crises, for
 example, but will this opposition work together, or in competition? Lust argues
 that the answer depends on whether the regime itself has excluded all opposition,
 or divided its opponents between loyalist and radical camps. In the former case,
 opposition parties should be expected to coalesce against the state, whereas in the
 latter, the divide and rule regime stratagem should be expected to work. Prior to
 the 1989 liberalisation process in Jordan, all political parties were illegal, and
 hence all were excluded from the system, even though the regime had a decades
 long understanding with the Muslim Brotherhood so that the latter operated as
 essentially a loyal opposition. But as the 1989 economic crisis hit, opposition
 forces from the secular left and the religious right were able to mobilise together to
 push the regime towards greater reform.44
 Elites from these and other opposition elements, along with conservative
 royalist forces, participated in the 1989 elections that followed and later in the
 1991 crafting of the National Charter (al-Mithaq al-Watani). The Charter
 formalised the relationship between regime and opposition, allowing for legal
 opposition activism and greater pluralism in public life, in return for loyalty to the
 Hashemite monarchy. But the shift in electoral rules prior to the 1993 election
 undercut opposition strength in parliament, paving the way for the regime to make
 peace with Israel, without an opposition majority in parliament blocking
 ratification of the accords. The regime's move to curb parliamentary opposition,
 however, only led to greater opposition coordination both inside and outside
 parliament itself.
 A first step towards cooperation in the new multi-party era was taken in 1995,
 when the IAF and seven leftist parties formed the so-called 'Anti-Normalization
 Committee'. While the opposition had failed to block the signing of a peace treaty
 with Israel, this committee was determined to prevent any normalisation of
 relations between various sectors of the two societies.45 In addition, the committee
 called for greater political liberalisation and domestic reform. The regime's
 response, however, was quite the opposite, as it moved to repress dissent and
 counter the opposition bloc. Regime hostility seemed to help further unite the
 opposition coalition, which expanded later in 1995 to include 13 opposition parties
 through the Higher Committee for the Coordination of National Opposition Parties
 (HCCNOP). The HCCNOP was intended, then and now, to be a forum bringing
 together all opposition parties in an effort to coordinate and pool their efforts for
 reform and democratisation. As will become apparent below, while the HCCNOP
 remains the most prominent party-driven reform coalition in the country,
 numerous additional groups, organisations and coalitions—often with overlapping
 membership—have emerged on the Jordanian political scene since the 1990s.
 Although varying in number and composition, these additional forces should not
 necessarily be seen as rival or replacement organisations to the HCCNOP, but
 44 E. Lust-Okar, 'Divided They Rule: The Management and Manipulation of Political Opposition', Comparative
 Politics, 36(2) (2004). p. 169; E. Lust-Okar, Structuring Conflict in the Arab World: Incumbents, Opponents, and
 Institutions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
 45 See Scham and Lucas, '"Normalization" and "Anti-Normalization" in Jordan'.
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 rather as multiple and mutually reinforcing efforts at opposition coordination in
 the kingdom.
 In 1996 yet another economic crisis—and another IMF austerity programme
 led the HCCNOP to call for a rejection of the IMF measures, especially the lifting
 of subsidies on bread and other staple foods. In the bread riots that followed, the
 opposition coalition maintained its pressure on the regime to shift away from its
 faith in neoliberal market reforms, arguing that privatisation and austerity
 measures were helping some in the wealthy elite, while harming average
 Jordanians.46 In 1997, the HCCNOP called for major changes in the electoral law,
 including equal population districts and the abrogation of the 'one-person one
 vote' system in favour of the previous block vote system. When these demands
 remained unmet, the opposition called for a national boycott of the 1997 elections,
 yielding, as mentioned above, a new parliament with few opposition voices
 (including only a handful of independent Islamist activists and leftist figures that
 had broken ranks with the boycott coalition).
 In 1998, opposition parties sought to further institutionalise and broaden their
 coalition by forming the Conference on National Reform (CNF), drawing together
 leftist parties, the Islamist movement, and independent opposition figures. In short,
 the newly formed Conference was intended to broaden opposition coordination
 beyond the forces hitherto represented within the HCCNOP, to include non-party
 opposition activists as well as the traditional parties.47 Since then, opposition
 parties and activists have met continually to discuss their interests, goals,
 strategies and tactics, sometimes within the framework of the HCCNOP and
 sometimes through the broader CNF.
 Yet despite these organised efforts to unite the country's political opposition, and
 even institutionalise it in a reform coalition, there are still significant areas of
 difference between and within opposition forces that render such cooperation
 difficult to sustain. The Islamist movement plays an important leadership role within
 the HCCNOP, for example, but is more than willing to break ranks from the
 opposition coalition, depending on the issue. As Janine Clark has shown, this often
 turns on gender issues and questions about reforming laws that especially affect
 women, such as personal status laws, divorce laws and laws regarding violence
 against women in the name of 'honour crimes'48 In general, the Islamists have
 proven to be both moderate and reactionary. The Muslim Brotherhood and IAF
 remain moderate in the sense of believing in reform and greater democracy, but they
 are by no means moderate in terms of policy and legislation 49 For instance, the
 movement opposed progressive attempts to change all the above laws, finding itself
 therefore in opposition to the monarchy, but allied with royalist conservative
 political parties. The leftist parties were themselves divided on these issues, but in
 general a broader pattern emerges. On democracy and liberalisation, it is the
 opposition reform coalition that is more progressive than the monarchy, but on
 social legislation, often the monarchy is far more progressive than the opposition
 parties. Similarly, most opposition parties opposed the Hashemite regime's
 introduction of a quota in 2003 to guarantee women's representation in parliament;
 46 C.R. Ryan, 'Peace, Bread, and Riots: Jordan and the International Monetary Fund', Middle East Policy, 6(2)
 (1998), pp. 54-66.
 47 Lust-Okar, 'Divided They Rule', p. 172.
 48 Clark, 'The Conditions of Islamist Moderation', p. 555.
 49 Ibid., pp. 555-556.
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 but the Islamists soon had to reverse field, when the first woman elected under the
 quota was herself an Islamist.
 More recently, in 2010, a broad range of opposition parties and NGOs together
 called yet again for major changes in the electoral law, preceding the 2010
 elections. Facilitated in part by the National Center for Human Rights, which was
 led by former prime minister Ahmad 'Ubaydat (1984-1985), the reform-oriented
 parties and NGOs called for a one-person two-vote, or mixed electoral system, in
 which citizens could vote for an individual district representative, and also for a
 party list at the national level. Together these groups formed an ad hoc umbrella
 coalition, the National Coalition for Reform (NCR).50 Informal and little
 institutionalised, the newly formed NCR included the previous groups and
 coalitions noted above (including most members of the HCCNOP), while
 expanding to also include independent activists and representatives of pro
 democracy NGOs. Although Ahmad 'Ubaydat formally 'led' this particular
 coalition, he was viewed by its members as effectively the main coordinator of the
 movement, but not as in any way in charge of any of the elements within the
 coalition itself.51
 Bringing together a broad range of opposition groups and activists, the
 ingredients seemed to have come together once again for a fairly unified and
 comprehensive reform coalition, with clear policy proposals for electoral change
 and the potential to pressure the regime toward meaningful change. Yet the
 regime, to quote one opposition activist, 'is really skilled at killing momentum'.52
 Despite months of opposition activism, reform proposals and extensive
 discussions across the Jordanian public sphere, the state issued the new electoral
 law, with the same gerrymandered districts, and no party lists or proportional
 representation.53 Thus, although the opposition was unified, well organised and
 presented viable policy alternatives, it remained yet again largely ineffective in
 actually achieving its desired reform objectives.
 One of the reasons why Jordan's opposition has been so ineffective in
 pressuring the regime for democratic change may lie in the fact that aside from the
 Islamists, most political parties carry little support in society. Indeed, while many
 democracy activists are active party members, most are not, and some seem to see
 the country's parties as weak and perhaps even as an obsolete form of
 opposition.54 They are generally viewed as ineffective, and it is that very weakness
 of the parties and the party system that has led many non-party reform activists to
 be openly scornful of the parties. As one such activist writer suggested, 'The
 Islamists and leftists, they are covered in dust'.55 Others, such as Hisham Bustani,
 have argued that the problem with the opposition is even more endemic.
 According to Bustani, the traditional opposition parties amount to an 'official'
 opposition that has far too many links to the regime itself. The time is therefore
 50 O. al-Rantawi, 'Coalition Presses for Electoral Reform in Jordan', Arab Reform Bulletin, 14 April 2010.
 51 Similarly, even when groups do overlap considerably, most activists do not seem to view one group as
 subsuming another, or one as being above another. They simply overlap, and individuals therefore are often
 participants in multiple organisations, groups or coalitions. Author's interviews with democracy activists,
 Amman, Jordan, June 2010, December 2010 and June 2011.
 52 Author interview with a youth and social media activist, Amman, Jordan, June 2011.
 53 Ryan, 'Jordan's New Electoral Law'.
 54 This point was made to me consistently in interviews with democracy activists, journalists and government
 officials, especially in June 2010, December 2010 and June 2011.
 55 Author interview, Amman, Jordan, June 2011.
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 more than ripe for an alternative opposition, beyond that of the traditional parties,
 which—again aside from the Islamists—is able to mobilise widespread popular
 support and thus more effectively challenge the regime's authoritarian policies.
 According to Bustani, this alternative opposition has recently emerged in the form
 of groups such as the Jordanian Campaign for Change, better known as 'Jayeen'—
 a mainly non-party-based reform coalition—although he argues that even this
 group might be problematic due to regime connections for at least some
 'opposition' elites, and limited in its mass appeal, due to its emphasis on a unitary
 (and seemingly East Jordanian) national identity. For Bustani this emphasis is
 inherently limiting; he refers to it as an 'isolationist vision'. He explains the
 alternative opposition as follows:
 What are the constituents of this 'alternative opposition'? Its main elements include the
 Jordanian Social Left Movement, the Jordanian National Initiative, the National
 Progressive Current, the National Committee of Military Veterans, the Jordanian Writers
 Association, the Nationalist Progressive Current, in addition to very small groups such as
 the Democratic Youth Union, the Philosophy Society, the Socialist Thought Forum, the
 Assembly of Circassean Youth, and the Association Against Zionism and Racism. All
 the above-mentioned groups (with the exception of the National Progressive Current, the
 National Committee of Military Veterans, and the Nationalist Progressive Current) form
 the so-called 'Movement of the Jordanian People.' And all those groups (without
 exception) form 'The Jordanian Campaign for Change - Jayeenand are closely allied at
 both the politics and logistical levels.56
 While many activists in both the 'official' and 'alternative' opposition are
 dedicated to genuine democratic reform, others seem to be using the movements as
 ways to counter other elites, and to get themselves back in office. Worse, Bustani
 argues, is the tendency for opposition coalitions like the Jordan Campaign for
 Change (Jayeen), to adopt the regime's own Jordanian nationalist rhetoric, and to
 emphasise a Jordanian national movement that is distinct from a Palestinian
 movement, thereby alienating much of the Jordanian population.57
 Jordan at present, therefore, now has not one but several reform coalitions with
 overlapping memberships and objectives, including party-led movements (such as
 the HCCNOP), non-party-led reform movements (such as Jayeen) and
 combinations of both (such as 'Ubaydat's National Coalition for Reform).58
 While they all agree that democratic change is essential, the question remains
 whether they are talking about the same reforms. I turn to this question below. For
 as the Arab uprisings shook the Middle East to its foundations, all the above
 parties, organisations and coalitions took to the streets, as Jordanians too
 demanded reform in a kind of de facto national 'street coalition' for change.
 The 2011 Arab Uprisings and Reformist Opposition in Jordan
 As noted above, the 2010 electoral law and parliamentary elections were
 disappointing for those concerned with real reform and political liberalisation, but
 56 H. Bustani, 'The Alternative Opposition in Jordan and the Failure to Understand the Lessons of the Tunisian
 and Egyptian Revolutions', Jadaliyya, 20 March 2011, http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/959 (accessed 20
 March 2011).
 57 Ibid., and author interview with Hisham Bustani, Amman. Jordan, 12 June 2001.
 58 Oraib Rantawi, director of the pro-democracy Al-Quds Center for Political Studies, estimated that the number
 of coalitions and youth movements had already reached more than 30, and was continuing to grow. Author
 interview with Oraib Rantawi, Amman, Jordan, 12 June 2011.
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 they did yield for the Hashemite regime the type of parliament it seemed to prefer,
 with a clear majority of MPs not from opposition parties but rather 'independents',
 whose backgrounds were loyalist, royalist, tribal and mostly Transjordanian. Yet
 the new government of Prime Minister Samir al-Rifa'i, appointed for a second
 time by the king in December 2010, barely had time to exhale before the Tunisian
 and Egyptian revolutions toppled longstanding dictators. In Jordan, the ripple
 effects and demonstrated efficacy of people in street activism in Tunis and Cairo
 led to marches and demonstrations that brought thousands into the streets in
 Amman and other Jordanian cities and towns. Like the demonstrations across the
 Arab world, Jordanians too marked theirs with heavy loads of patriotic symbolism,
 while demanding democratic change. But unlike their Tunisian and Egyptian
 counterparts, the Jordanian demonstrators demanded the dismissal of the Rifa'i
 government, but not regime change itself.
 The demonstrations themselves sometimes varied in terms of participants and
 some demands. There have been, for example, protests for greater media and press
 freedom, and protests against state repression in other Arab countries (such as
 Libya, Syria and Yemen), while other much smaller demonstrations demanded the
 release of numerous Salafi Jihadists in Jordanian prisons. Clearly, these
 demonstrations had nothing whatsoever in common and included few overlaps
 in terms of participants and objectives. But the larger demonstrations—those that
 numbered in the thousands—were demonstrations for democratic reform and
 echoed calls that opposition parties and civil society groups had been making for
 years. A Jordanian journalist covering the protests, and supportive of democratic
 reform efforts, summarised the emerging opposition consensus:
 What needs to change? We need to bring back checks and balances, and to respect the
 original constitution. It envisioned that the parliament would do two main things, legislate
 and hold government accountable. But over time, it really does neither, and power shifted
 almost entirely to the monarchy.59
 After years of struggles over the nature of elections and election laws, opposition
 demands have thus shifted to the nature of parliament itself. Many Jordanians
 today view parliament as merely a pro-Hashemite tribal assembly. All democracy
 activists, regardless of ideological, ethnic, or religious background, seem to agree
 that in addition to electoral reform (still a major demand), parliament too must
 change and become a more genuine legislative body, which, in turn, implies
 changes regarding the nature of government and of the constitution itself.
 This suggests, in other words, that in addition to diverse grievances, there is also
 a coherent and consistent set of demands that most opposition forces (and many
 regime reformers themselves) agree on. For all the diversity of the coalitions,
 parties and groups noted above, both old and new coalitions and activists agree on
 at least the following set of reform demands: (1) they want parliament to be a body
 that actually legislates, rather than simply implementing cabinet initiatives or
 royal decrees; (2) they all want government to be drawn from the elected
 representatives of the people—that is, they want a more truly parliamentary
 system, rather than a royally appointed government separate from parliament; (3)
 they all demand an end of the 'one person one vote' electoral system, potentially
 replaced with a mixed electoral system, coupled with the ability for voters to cast
 59 Author interview, Amman, Jordan, June 2011.
 383
 CURTIS R. RYAN
 multiple votes (up to the number of representatives for a given district); (4) they all
 call for fewer restrictions on media, press and publications, including a shift away
 from timid and often self-censored reporting, and an end to mukhabarat
 interference in the media and in public life in general; (5) they all demand an end
 to corruption and the establishment of a more independent judiciary to hold the
 corrupt accountable for their actions; and (6) many want districts that are equal in
 size rather than gerrymandered, although this point remains controversial among
 democracy activists.
 At present, electoral districts are unevenly representative, designed to increase
 rural representation (and hence usually conservative, pro-regime, East Jordanian
 communities), while limiting urban representation (since the largest cities such as
 Amman, Irbid and Zarqa have large Palestinian populations). The ethnic
 implications of redistricting (implying a major shift from East Jordanian to
 Palestinian empowerment) therefore suggest that this particular reform question
 remains the single most divisive one among the various opposition parties and
 coalitions. We can assume, therefore, that elites that feel threatened within the
 regime, particularly those in the mukhabarat, will exploit these differences by
 stoking these fears, in an effort to prevent the emergence of a single, unified and
 truly national coalition for change in Jordan.60
 While the above reform demands all suggest political changes, it is worth
 underscoring that in Jordan and across the Arab world, part of the revolt against
 the status quo seems to be not just a revolt against particular governing systems,
 but also a rejection of neoliberal economic policies. These are associated in the
 minds of many across society with enriching the already wealthy, while removing
 the previous social safety nets of large public sectors with greater guarantees of
 employment and social welfare. In the Jordanian context, these economic policies
 have also had profound ethnic implications, given the traditional predominance of
 Palestinians in the private sector and East Jordanians in the public sector. While
 leftist and Islamist parties have for years regarded neoliberal reform with
 suspicion and even overt hostility, in more recent years even traditionally pro
 regime conservatives have joined the chorus against this particular type of
 economic reform. Conservative East Jordanian nationalists have increasingly
 charged their own regime with corruption and selling off Jordan's national assets
 in the name of short-term profits. They have even been so bold as to link these
 policies with the queen herself, comparing Queen Rania to the deposed first ladies
 of Tunisia and Egypt.61
 Indeed, economic grievances have been a large part of the motivation for the
 'southern movement' in particular; that is, largely non-party-based activism
 outside of the capital, Amman, and based rather in towns such as Karak, Ma'an,
 Tafila and Theiban. The activities of the 'southern movement' overlap with the
 'alternative opposition', alluded to by Bustani (above), but include largely
 independent youth organisations such as the Karak Popular Youth Movement, the
 Free Tafileh Movement, and the Ma'an Popular Movement for Change and
 60 In my own persona] observations of Jordanian politics over more than 20 years, I would argue that the pattern is
 for anti-reform journalists, activists or officials to insist that pro-democracy opponents are an ethnic or religious
 threat to the identity of Jordan. In short, anti-reformers try to create disunity by exploiting social divisions and
 fears, and then (ironically) accuse their opponents of threatening 'national unity'. Indeed, there is no more
 pervasive phrase in the anti-reform lexicon than invoking national unity against opponents, putting them instantly
 on the defensive, and effectively challenging their loyalty and patriotism.
 61 BBC News, 'Jordan Tribes Criticize Queen Rania's "Political Role'", 8 February 2011.
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 Reform.62 Each of these groups expresses particular pride in the role of the (largely
 East Bank Jordanian) south in creating the political reform revivals of both 1989
 and 2011, and each focuses in particular on the problems of privatisation,
 Amman-centric investment and development, and especially government
 corruption related to all of the above.63 Opposition to economic liberalisation
 thus certainly carries the potential to unite otherwise disparate ideological forces,
 such as leftists, Islamists and secular nationalists. But paradoxically, it is also just
 as likely to create deeper fissures in Jordan's already established political fault
 lines, such as Palestinian and East Jordanian identity politics. As Nicolas Pelham
 has noted, this has led to a kind of reversal, in which some conservative East
 Jordanian nationalists have become harshly critical of the regime, while
 Palestinians in Jordan's business community find themselves in the role of
 defenders of the monarchy.64 In short, anti-neoliberalism has at times brought
 together a very broad group of activists, for reform away from privatisation
 and towards a revitalisation of the social welfare role of the state. Yet the ethnic
 tensions inherent in the same controversial issue carry the potential to tear that very
 coalition apart.
 Ultimately, whether reformers and democracy activists can unite effectively or
 not, the widespread discontent across almost all sectors of Jordanian society
 suggests that clearly much needs to change in terms of both political and economic
 reform in the kingdom for the security and well-being of both state and society. In
 that context, Jordan's wide-ranging political opposition, spanning opposition
 parties and numerous civil society organisations, has had a long history of
 organisation and activism, but with little effect on government policy. The state, in
 turn, has long practised a politics of inclusion and co-optation of some opposition,
 while allowing others to vent some level of frustration, and actively attempting
 to divide still others.65 But many of these mechanisms—from co-optation to
 coercion—are now all too familiar to opposition forces. And given the large
 presence of increasingly politicised and active youth in public demonstrations in
 Jordan—youth who very often identify with neither the state nor its traditional
 opposition forces—it is also clear that older methods are no longer enough to
 contain opposition. 'The palace also seems to always see challenges even when
 they are actually opportunities,' noted one Jordanian journalist. 'They could
 embrace and even lead reform efforts. But they do not. The times have changed,
 and the tools of rule need to change with them.'66 Also emphasising change, a
 veteran reform and democracy activist noted the importance of generational
 change in the expanding Jordanian reform movement, and the extensive use of
 62 T. Luck, 'Southern Protests Continue', Jordan Times, 8 July 2011.
 63 While many Jordanian youth movements were inspired to reform activism by the Tunisian and Egyptian
 revolutions, the first of these movements actually emerged on 7 January 2011 (before the 25 January 2011
 Egyptian revolution) in the form of the Theiban Popular Movement for Change in Theiban, Jordan, calling for an
 end to corruption and the ouster of the government of then-Prime Minister Samir al-Rifa'i. For a discussion of the
 dynamics of organisation of many of the movements, see T. Luck, 'Despite Differences, Youth Movements Still
 Depend on Traditional Parties to Materialise', Jordan Times, 29 July 2011.
 64 N. Pelham, 'Jordan's Balancing Act', Middle East Report Online, 22 February 2011, http://www.merip.org/
 mero/mero022211 (accessed 22 February 2011).
 65 See, for example, Muhammad Abu Rumman's analysis of state-opposition relations and divisions within the
 Islamist movement in 'Jordan's Parliamentary Elections and Islamist Boycott', Arab Reform Bulletin, 20 October
 2010.
 66 Author interview in Amman, Jordan, June 2011.
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 social media, especially Facebook, Twitter and blogging, to organise
 demonstrations and activism:
 The parties are not near people's hearts and minds. That's why they have these Facebook
 groups. That's their political parties. It is like an election, people signing up and 'liking'
 and agreeing to support a figure or group or demonstration. Social media is their device to
 convert and share their aspirations. But the mukhabarat are also now trying to infiltrate
 social media groups. But people just aren't afraid anymore. Measures that used to scare
 people just don't now. They are sure that they are smarter than the regime. They are just
 not afraid.67
 Youth activists have emerged to re-invigorate the longstanding efforts of reform
 and democracy activists. Often organised as youth or 'Shabab' groups via
 Facebook, the groups and individuals stay connected through multiple social
 media platforms, not just through Facebook, Twitter and blogging but also simply
 through cell phone calls, texting and direct personal contact. The Shabab
 movements in 2011 played a large role in the demonstrations that ousted the Rifa'i
 government, and pulled together to form the March 24 Shabab Movement, staging
 an all day and night demonstration for democracy and reform in the Ministry of
 Interior Circle in Amman. While youth groups may have led the organisation, like
 all demonstrations it quickly fanned out from there as groups and individuals
 contacted each other. The result was an exercise in genuine grassroots democracy.
 The demonstration may have been organised by the newer opposition coalition or
 'alternative opposition', but it came to include participants from the more
 traditional opposition as well.68 The peaceful demonstrators represented the
 diversity of Jordan itself: men and women, young and old, rich and poor, Muslim
 and Christian, secular and Islamist, and included East Jordanians, Palestinians and
 Circassians. As was true of most 2011 demonstrations, however, the majority were
 East Bankers or Transjordanians, and they marked their democratic protests with
 extensive nationalist symbols—red check keffiyas (rather than black and white
 checkered Palestinian keffiyas), Jordanian flags, flag face paint, blaring nationalist
 songs, and so on. Yet despite all this effort, the demonstrations were broken up the
 next morning by armed and angry nationalist youths, known as bultajiyya
 or 'thugs', who scattered the protesters. Hundreds were injured and one died,
 apparently of a heart attack.69
 What was intended as a pinnacle type of moment turned quickly from
 democracy to bedlam, but has since served as a rallying cry for reform. Still more
 groups and events have emerged, with the 24-25 March 2011 dates remembered
 and commemorated as perhaps high and low points in Jordanian reform and
 activism. Since then, in addition to frequent Friday demonstrations throughout the
 kingdom in 2011, youth activists have continued to organise and also to broaden
 their networks to engage as diverse a cross-section of Jordanian society as
 possible. They organised, for example, public discussions on reform, social media,
 the constitution and even the role of the mukhabarat, in what are known as the
 67 Author interview in Amman, Jordan, June 2011.
 68 Since demonstrations took place across Jordan from the beginning of January onwards throughout 2011, they
 have varied in composition. Those in the hundreds tended to include either party activists (usually leftists and
 Islamists together) or youth movements, but those that grew to include thousands of demonstrators seemed to span
 the spectrum of traditional and newer forms of opposition.
 69 See the account by democracy activist and blogger Naseem Tarawneh, 'The Quick Death of Shabab 24 and
 What it Means for Jordan', Black Iris of Jordan [blog], 26 March 2011, http://www.black-iris.com/2011/03/26/
 the-quick-death-of-shabab-march-24-and-what-it-means-for-jordan/ (accessed 30 July 2011).
 386
 POLITICAL OPPOSITION AND REFORM COALITIONS IN JORDAN
 Hashtag debates. And true to form regarding their savvy use of technology, the
 youth activists made sure to live stream the debates online.70
 Meanwhile the number of youth movements continues to expand to include
 virtually every town and city in the country. In addition to the southern
 movements, therefore, youth movements have also emerged in northern towns like
 Irbid, Jerash, Mafraq and Zarqa. Yet while each movement sees itself as
 independent, many also overlap in membership with the youth wings of various
 political parties. Indeed, in the words of journalist Taylor Luck, 'many of the
 popular movements are caught in a love-hate relationship of dependence with
 traditional opposition parties and professional associations'.71 Many youth
 movements draw on the organisation and logistical experience of organised parties
 in order to generate public support for their demonstrations, even as they remain
 independent organisations.72
 Despite setbacks such as the March 25 violence, most Jordanians remain
 strongly in favour of reform rather than full regime change. Meanwhile, outside
 Jordan, the descent into violence following the Arab uprisings in Libya, Yemen
 and Syria may actually have helped the Hashemite monarchy in perhaps an odd
 way. No Jordanian wishes to see their country take these violent paths, and such
 examples of social chaos may have bought the monarchy at least some more time.
 And most Jordanians seem willing to give the king a chance to join or lead efforts
 towards real democratic reform. In a nationally televised speech to the nation on
 12 June 2011, the king decried disunity, fitna, and irresponsible media reporting.
 But he also called for strengthening the party system and for democratic
 governments drawn from the elected parliament, rather than appointed by royal
 decree. If the latter idea is indeed implemented, it meets a major demand across
 the reformist opposition spectrum. As one activist put it, summarising the general
 view, 'it's a good idea ... if it happens', because the speech omitted any timetable
 for implementing this key opposition demand.73
 This level of instant scepticism has been well earned. Despite extensive verbal
 support for reform, and unveiling recurrent campaigns advocating reform, the
 regime had seemed to tilt more consistently in a conservative direction over the
 last few years, essentially siding with the more reactionary traditional elite over
 the reformers, at least in terms of limiting democratisation. The regime
 periodically provides small elements of reform and change to keep those reformers
 (and foreign critics) at bay, usually with new slogans and marketing campaigns
 having more prominence than the actual reforms. As one disappointed reform
 activist and former policy-maker noted, the monarchy's 'words are with the
 reformers, but its actions are for the status quo'.74
 In response to the 2011 unrest, the monarchy dismissed the government,
 replacing a largely technocratic business elite with more veteran political figures,
 70 The activists tweeted their reactions during the debate, while also receiving questions, via Twitter, from those
 who could not participate in person. See, for example, the Hashtag debate with former National Agenda for
 Reform leader, Dr. Marwan Muasher, at http://www.jordandays.tv/showVideol.aspx7VidId =1813 (accessed 25
 July 2011).
 71 Luck, 'Despite Differences'.
 72 Some movements have gone further organisationally, such as the Karak Popular Youth Movement, by creating
 a steering committee to include representatives from parties and professional associations as well as independent
 activists. Luck, 'Despite Differences'.
 73 C.R. Ryan, 'The King's Speech', Foreign Policy, Middle East Channel, 17 June 2011, http://mideast.
 foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/06/17/the_kings_speech (accessed 17 July 2011).
 74 Author interview with reform activist, Washington, DC, June 2010.
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 including Prime Minister Ma'aruf al-Bakhit. Bakhit, a former military officer with
 more than 30 years of service in the armed forces, had served earlier as prime
 minister, during the now discredited 2007 elections. While Bakhit may have
 reassured security-oriented East Jordanian nationalists and conservatives, his
 appointment was profoundly disappointing to democratic activists who had hoped
 for a reformer. In typical Hashemite politics, however, the king also appointed a
 more progressive veteran political leader (and one of the most influential
 Palestinian Jordanians in the kingdom), Senate Speaker Taher al-Masri, to head
 the National Dialogue Committee on reform. Both the new prime minister and the
 king met with leaders of the IAF and Muslim Brotherhood in an effort to cool
 domestic tensions and also to discuss the possibility of Islamist figures taking
 cabinet posts and joining the National Dialogue Committee (the Islamists refused
 on both counts). The regime was in full crisis mode, attempting to mollify both
 traditional bases of support and traditional sources of opposition. But the time
 honoured techniques of reshuffling cabinets, blaming previous governments
 (rather than the monarchy) for failure to implement reform, and issuing royal calls
 for more reform will ring hollow unless followed by real reform.75
 But an alternative politics is also possible, without requiring either street
 revolutions, overthrow of the regime or even radically disruptive change. Rather,
 the blueprints for greater reform have already been written, ironically under the
 regime's own guidance. King Abdullah has only to dust off the detailed proposals
 (that happen to include most opposition demands) already written by the royal
 National Agenda Committee, echoed later by the state-appointed National Center
 for Human Rights (NCHR), and endorsed by a coalition of reform-minded
 opposition parties. Indeed, the NCHR itself issued a statement stressing that the
 lack of real reform in the kingdom amounted to 'the gravest danger to the safety
 and security of society and to national unity'.76
 In May 2011, yet another reform coalition emerged in Jordanian politics, but
 one that had the potential to bridge many of the parties, groups and movements
 discussed in this analysis. The National Front for Reform, led by former prime
 minister Ahmad 'Ubaydat, included the Islamic Action Front, all the leftist parties
 discussed above, and the Jordanian Women's Union, and intended to bring under
 its umbrella the various youth movements as well. 'They [the youth movements]
 can be closer to the street than people our age and at the level of our political
 experiences,' 'Ubaydat argued, 'but they also need us and we need them.'77
 Perhaps the time has come for another convergence of regime and opposition
 elites—as in the 1991 National Charter—to chart the course for a more open and
 inclusive Jordanian system.78 Unlike the desperate flailing attempts of regimes in
 Libya, Syria or Yemen to stay in power, the Hashemite regime need only take its
 own advice. If it does so, it will once again provide an example to the region, as it
 did in 1989. If not, then the fire next time may consume it.
 75 L. Andoni, 'Jordanians Demand Change', Al-Jazeera, 21 February 2011, http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/
 opinion/2011/02/2011220105658153939.html (accessed 30 July 2011).
 7 NCHR: Government Negligence of Real Reform is Greatest Danger to National Unity, Security, Amnion News,
 4 February 2011, http://en.ammonnews.net/article.aspx?articleNO=l 1507
 77 A.T. Homoud, 'Reform Gets a Heavyweight', JO Magazine, 3 July 2011.
 78 Al-Rantawi. 'Coalition Presses for Electoral Reform in Jordan'; National Democratic Institute, 'In Jordan,
 Coalition Unites for Electoral Reform', 3 March 2010, http://www.ndi.org/print/16087 (accessed 30 July 2011).
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 Conclusions
 This analysis has shown extensive levels of pro-reform and pro-democracy
 activism in Jordanian politics, but with little success in achieving reform. In
 addition to an ever-expanding number of NGOs, civil society groups, trade unions
 and professional associations, Jordanian politics has seen decades of opposition
 activism and coordination, involving established left-wing and Pan-Arab
 nationalist parties as well as the larger and more popular Jordanian Islamist
 movement (including the Muslim Brotherhood, the IAF and independent
 Islamists). In addition, newer reform movements have emerged, from coalitions
 such as the Jordanian Campaign for Change to the March 24 Shabab Movement
 and increasingly pervasive youth and social media activism. But for all their
 presence, activism and attempts at coordination, Jordan's reformers and
 democracy activists are more pluralist than a single reform coalition, and to
 date, have had limited effectiveness in achieving reform and change.
 Yet in some ways, observing Jordanian reform struggles is like watching two
 coalitions manoeuvre and spar with one another. One is a tighter, narrower,
 conservative anti-reform coalition embedded in key institutions in the state itself.
 The other group is a set of coalitions for reform, and hence is a more broad, diverse
 and highly pluralistic set of groups that comprise a coalition in only the loosest
 possible sense. These include the traditional opposition rooted in Islamist, leftist
 and nationalist parties, as well as a series of youth movements, NGOs, trade unions
 and other pro-reform groups. This general image, however—of two sparring sets
 of coalitions—would seem to suggest a distinct advantage for the anti-reform
 coalition so deeply imbedded in the regime itself. But what is also most noticeable
 in the sparring between these two large sets of forces is that they sometimes appear
 to belong to two different centuries.
 The king's own former leader of regime reform efforts, Marwan Muasher,
 emphasised in his report for the Carnegie Foundation that the problem is not
 unique to Jordan, but can indeed be found throughout the region. Entrenched elites
 oppose reform, he argues, because they occupy 'a privileged position that would
 be compromised by merit-based systems, rather than ones based on clientelism
 and patronage'.79 In the specific case of Jordan, he adds, the ruling elite, and
 especially anti-reform elites, need to realise that they are deluding themselves, but
 no one else. 'The political elite must recognize that the only way they can retain
 power is by sharing it,' Muasher argues, 'and governments will have to
 acknowledge that substituting serious implementation with reform rhetoric fools
 no one.'80
 Meanwhile, the layer of fear does indeed seem to have been lifted in Jordan and
 across the Arab world, and in some ways it is represented by the contrast between
 tweeting, blogging and Facebooking shabab movements, on the one hand, and the
 crude physical and brutal methods of the bultajiyya, on the other. The image of
 that contrast, in short, should serve simply to remind outside observers that most
 Jordanians are under the age of 30. Most have been hearing about reform promises
 and campaigns all their lives. Many, but not all, are tapped into broader regional
 and global networks, are well educated and literate, and are not shy about voicing
 79 M. Muasher, A Decade of Struggling Reform Efforts in Jordan: The Resilience of the Rentier System
 (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2011), p. 4.
 80 Ibid., p. 23.
 389
 CURTIS R. RYAN
 their political views. The future, they feel, is clearly theirs and hence is a future of
 reform and democracy in Jordan. Yet the fact remains that the electoral delays,
 problematic electoral laws and other forms of de-liberalisation have only
 undermined public confidence in reform, political liberalisation and the regime
 itself.
 The wildcard, as always in Jordanian politics, is the role of the king and of the
 palace. Some of the king's advisors are themselves dedicated reformers; most,
 however, seem to come from precisely the opposite camp. But these reformers
 remain emphatic that the king is still with them, and has simply been thwarted at
 seemingly every turn by an old elite that the king inherited from his late father, and
 a newly entrenched elite that is, ironically, largely of his own making.81 Among
 more grassroots reform activists, in contrast, there is considerably less faith that
 the monarchy is really with them. And while the instincts and goals of the
 democratic opposition forces remain reformist rather than revolutionary, with
 calls for policy change rather than regime change, the monarchy itself increasingly
 faces three clear choices regarding reform and democratisation that have been
 faced by many a government before it: lead, follow, or be forced out of the way.
 81 The two largest parts of the regime's ruling political elite might therefore also be seen to include more
 specifically an old guard largely East Jordanian elite rooted in the bureaucracy, security services and armed
 forces, and a newer elite (that arose with King Abdullah's accession to the throne) of more business-oriented
 technocratic elites, including both East Jordanians and Palestinians. In his analysis, Bustani notes that the latter
 group tends to be seen as 'neoliberal' but that both groups actually tend to subscribe to this ideology. See Bustani,
 'The Alternative Opposition in Jordan'.
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